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ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY'S 
1997 ELECTION BUDGET PROPOSALS 
by Peter W. Wood, Pieda pic 
Few, if any, economists would dispute that Scotland 
would be economically viable as an independent 
country. It is quite evident that Scotland's economy 
is larger, more prosperous and more soundly based 
than that of many existing independent states. 
However, there is much less agreement as to 
whether an independent Scotland would be more or 
less prosperous than a Scotland which remained 
within the UK. In the long term, the answer to this 
question would depend upon whether independence 
exerted a positive or negative impact on growth; 
much work remains to be done in this important 
area and it is difficult to reach any firm 
conclusions. In the short term, the ability of an 
independent Scottish government to maintain (or 
improve upon) the present balkanise of public 
spending and taxation would be critical to the living 
standards of Scots. 
During the 1997 Election campaign the Scottish 
National Party produced a hypothetical budget 
which argued that an independent Scotland could 
increase public spending and tax breaks by £1,000 
million in 1997-98 over and above the levels 
planned by the then government while raising taxes 
on incomes and tobacco by only £200 million. 
Further, over the period to 2001, the budget 
proposed increased public expenditure and tax 
breaks of almost £6,000 million (equivalent to a 
public spending increase of 20%) with the overall 
tax burden being increased by a mere £80 million. 
The SNP argued that these tax and spending plans 
could be implemented while reducing the national 
debt below Scotland's share of the UK debt. It was 
further argued that the extra public spending would 
result in a dramatic increase in the growth of the 
economy - for example, the budget document 
claimed that by the year 2000 the economy of an 
SNP led independent Scotland would be growing at 
a rate one third above the level which would apply 
if Scotland remained in the UK. 
The key to the SNP's budgetary arithmetic is in the 
calculation of the budget deficit or surplus - the 
difference between Scottish public expenditure 
(consisting of spending by government departments 
in Scotland and Scotland's share of UK-wide items 
such as defence) and taxes raised in Scotland. The 
SNP claim that calculations of this deficit show that 
Scotland contributes more to the UK exchequer, 
when account is taken of North Sea Oil and Gas 
related revenues, than is spent in or on behalf of 
Scotland. An independent Scottish government 
would control the fiscal surplus which Scotland is 
said to be paying to the rest of the UK and could 
apply it to the programmes oudined in the SNP 
budget. 
The calculation, indeed the existence, of this surplus 
relies heavily on the assertion that the Scottish 
budget deficit (excluding oil revenues) can be 
reliably estimated as being 17.9% of the 
corresponding UK budget deficit in every year. 
The SNP, therefore, calculate the Scottish "non-oil" 
deficit as 17.9% of the forecast UK deficits for the 
next few years. The SNP also assume that an 
independent Scotland would enjoy 90% of the 
revenues gained from various taxes on the 
production of North Sea Oil; not all commentators 
accept that Scotland could obtain this share of the 
revenues. The assumed revenues from North Sea 
Oil, along with an allowance for privatisation 
receipts, are subtracted from the budget deficit 
figure described above to produce the independent 
Scotland budget deficit. Figures based on the SNP 
procedures are shown in Table 1. 
Data supplied to the SNP from HM Treasury in 
response to an SNP Parliamentary Question indicate 
that over the period 1979 -1995 the total of Scottish 
deficits was estimated to be 17.9% of UK deficits -
though the proportion fluctuates from year to year. 
The same data also indicate that a Scottish 
government which secured 90% of North Sea 
revenues would have enjoyed substantial budget 
surpluses through most of the 1980s. This is the 
platform from which the SNP launch their 
projections of large budget surpluses for a Scottish 
exchequer in the late 1990s. 
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However the hypothetical budget surpluses which 
would have arisen in the 1980s are no guide to the 
position in the late 1990s. The first, and obvious, 
point is that North Sea revenues are now a fraction 
of the levels of the mid-1980s and will not be 
returning to those levels. The second point, which 
is of critical importance to the validity of the SNP 
argument, is that the assumption that the Scottish 
"non-oil" deficit/surplus will be a constant 17.9% of 
the UK level will not be valid in the conditions of 
the late 1990s. 
Scotland's share of the UK deficit is obviously 
much more than Scotland's share of the UK 
economy or population (8.8%). The reason for this 
is that Scotland's share of public spending (10.2%) 
is greater than its share of tax revenues (8.9% -
excluding, for the moment, North Sea revenues). 
As a result of this, Scotland has a structural deficit 
in its public finances such that if the UK as a whole 
had a zero deficit Scotland would still have an 
excess of spending over revenue. It also follows 
from this that the smaller is the UK deficit the 
greater the share accounted for by the Scottish 
element. This point is clearly borne out by the 
figures obtained by the SNP. 
In providing information in response to the SNP 
question, the Treasury placed a large "Health 
Warning" on the data for the period before 1990. 
Table 2 reproduces the data for the period since 
1990. In that table the Scottish share of the UK 
deficit is clearly seen to be higher when the UK 
deficit is relatively low. In calculating its future 
Scottish budget deficits, the SNP has used a figure 
for the Scottish share which is too low. The UK 
budget deficit is projected to fall steeply over the 
next few years and to become a surplus in the year 
2000. Logic and the evidence of the past both 
indicate that under these conditions the Scottish 
share of the UK deficit will rise sharply. 
By applying the figure of 17.9% to projected "non 
- oil" UK budget deficits in the range £7,000 to 
£24,000 million the SNP has underestimated the 
Scottish deficits for the years concerned. For 
example, the UK non oil budget deficit for 1999/00 
is projected to be £6,700 million: when the UK 
deficit was last near that level, in 1990/91, the 
Scottish deficit accounted for 57% of the UK total. 
The procedure adopted by the SNP in calculating 
the budget deficit tends to conceal more than it 
reveals about the generation of the budget deficit or 
surplus. The budget deficit or surplus is determined 
by the balance between revenue and spending and 
an analysis which focuses on the nature and level of 
public spending, taxation and other revenue 
gathering will be clearer and more comprehensive 
than the process of projecting deficits. Studies of 
Government Expenditure and Revenue in Scotland, 
particularly those prepared by the civil servants in 
the Scottish Office, have provided a growing 
volume of detailed evidence on which to build an 
assessment of the likely budgetary position of an 
independent Scotland. 
The Scottish Office publication Government 
Expenditure and Revenue in Scotland 1994-95 
contains detailed figures for spending by the 
Scottish Office and various calculations of 
Scotland's share of UK wide spending and of 
government revenues. Taking the figures from that 
report and uprating them in line with the 
expenditure and revenue information contained in 
the Financial Statement and Budget Report 
1997-98 (the Red Book) and taking on board the 
SNP's figure for Scotland's share of North Sea 
revenues, we obtain the Scottish Budget deficit 
figures shown in Table 3. 
The SNP has produced estimates of income and 
expenditure for 1996-97 which show higher receipts 
and lower spending than implied by the figures 
above. In particular, the SNP have argued that the 
government's figures underestimate Scottish Income 
Tax payments. However, the SNP's criticisms of 
the extensive analysis by the Inland Revenue used 
to produce the estimates are not well founded. 
Moreover, the SNP's proposed alternative to the 
Inland Revenue procedures, i.e. that income tax 
revenues should be calculated pro-rata with 
population, is flawed in that it fails to allow for the 
fact that Scotland has proportionately more low 
earners and fewer high earners than has the rest of 
the UK. The Inland Revenue survey data 
represents the best available basis for calculating 
income tax revenue. The SNP's rejection of 
Inland Revenue calculations leads, for example, to 
an overestimate of Income Tax revenues 
amounting to £600 million. 
The SNP income and expenditure calculations 
generally understate the costs which would be 
involved in running an independent government. 
These costs, which were listed in the Scottish 
Office calculations as the "Other Unidentified 
Expenditure" element, amount to over £1,000 
million. 
The figures set out in Table 3 imply that in 1997-98 
an independent Scotland would have a budget 
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deficit of 3.7% of GDP. Scotland would be even 
less well placed than Germany to meet the 
Maastricht Treaty criterion for Debt/GDP - though 
it remains to be seen whether this will be "fudged"! 
Perhaps more importantly, such deficits would 
certainly produce an unfavourable reaction in the 
capital markets. Implementation of the proposed 
SNP budget would make the situation untenable by 
any standards since the deficit would be raised to 
5% of GDP. 
The SNP Budget document went on to propose 
further spending increases so that by 2001 the 
budget deficit would have risen to almost £7,000 
million: this would be nearly 10% of GDP even 
allowing for steady GDP growth and would plainly 
be far beyond the realms of the financially 
sustainable. 
While the SNP argues that most of its spending 
increases would be financed out of a large (non-
existent) relative financial surplus, it also argues 
that its expenditure programme would produce 
rapidly increased economic growth, rising 
government revenues and falling welfare spending. 
This claim is based on modelling by Mackay 
Consultants. The structural equations underlying 
this model are not shown by the SNP but it would 
be useful to be able to inspect them. The results 
generated by this model imply that the economy has 
distinctive characteristics since a very large boost to 
demand is shown to produce rapid output growth 
without adverse impacts on inflation or, apparently, 
the Balance of Payments. 
Quite aside from the issue of the underlying 
economic model, it is a feature of the SNP budget 
that it involves a large injection of demand to the 
economy while not involving measures which could 
be expected to impact on the supply side of the 
economy in the same time period if at all. 
As stated at the beginning of this paper, Scotland 
could function perfectly well as an independent 
country and with some determined belt tightening in 
terms of reduced public spending and/or tax 
increases the country could reach the Maastricht 
Debt criterion for EMU. Whether the Scottish 
economy would become a "Celtic Tiger" in the 
long term is far less certain but the idea that 
independence would deliver an instant public 
spending "bonus" is untenable. 
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Table 1 
§im 
%m 99/00 
00A)1 
U K B u d g e t 
Deficit/Surplus 
(ex Oil Revenues) 
-£23,700 million 
-£15,900 million 
-£6,700 million 
+£3,500 million 
Scottish Deficit 
(ex Oil Revenues) 
-£4,000 million 
-£2,700 million 
-£1,139 million 
+£595 million 
S c o t t i s h O i l 
Revenues 
£3,600 million 
£3,500 million 
£3,300 million 
£3,200 million 
Overall Scottish 
Deficit/Surplus 
-£400 million 
+£800 million 
+£2,161 million 
+£3,795 million 
Table 2 
Year 
1990/91 
1991/92 
1992/93 
1993/94 
1994/95 
UK Non-Oil Deficit 
£8,700 million 
£26,100 million 
£52,100 million 
£57,200 million 
£48,100 million 
Scottish Share 
57% 
22% 
17% 
17% 
17% 
Table 3 
Year 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
S c o t t i s h 
Expenditure 
£32,500m 
£33,600m 
£34,5O0m 
£35,400m 
Scottish Non-Oil 
Revenue 
£26,300m 
£27,800m 
£29,500m 
£31,000m 
North Sea Oil 
R e v e n u e and 
Privatisation 
£3,800m 
£3,600m 
£3,400m 
£3,200m 
Budget Deficit 
£2,400m 
£2,200m 
£ 1,600m 
£ 1,200m 
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